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Case Comment
DE NICHOLS v. CURLIER
REVISITED
By DARRELL E. BuRss, JR.*
A. DE NICHOLS v. CURLIER
Generally, property rights between spouses in Canada and the United
States are determined according to one or the other of two legal regimes.
Spouses are treated in such matters as if they were single persons in provinces
or states that have their historical roots in the common law.' On the other
hand, in jurisdictions that have their historical connections in the civil law,
spouses are treated as joint owners of the assets of the marriage.2 The ambula-
tory ways of life today often result in the transposition of married couples
from one of these regimes to the other. In such an event, conflict of law
problems arise, and considering the disparate characteristics of these two
regimes, the solution adopted by the courts can have a great impact on the
nature and extent of each spouse's interest in the matrimonial property.3 Are
the spouses' property rights immutably fixed by the law of their matrimonial
domicile notwithstanding subsequent changes in their domicile? Or do their
property rights vary with changes? Or indeed perhaps the courts ought to
respond by applying an amalgam of these two possibilities?
This comment examines these problems solely in relation to the spouses'
movable property.4 De Nichols v. Curlier5 is the leading case. De Nichols
© Copyright, 1976, Darrell E. Burns, Jr., LL.B., LL.M.
* Mr. Bums is currently articling in Vancouver.
'The separate property regime was established by legislation: see, e.g., Married
Women's Property Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 262; Married Women's Property Act, 1882, 45
& 46 Vict., c. 75; Married Women's Property (Scotland) Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5,
c. 6. It has been criticized for its failure to adequately recognize and account for a wife's
additions to the matrimonial property in the form of services and other indirect financial
contributions: see, Eberts, A Synopsis of Proposals for Family Property Reform (1973-
74), 1 Estates & Trusts Q. 298. But, see, Goodman, A Critique of Family Property Re-
form (1973-74), 1 Estates & Trusts Q. 315. The Ontario Legislature responded to these
criticisms by enacting The Family Law Reform Act, 1975, S.O. 1975, c. 41.
2 Nonetheless, in community property regimes, the husband is imbued with exten-
sive administrative powers over the matrimonial property. See, generally, W. De Funiak
and M. Vaughan, Principles of Community Property (2nd ed. Tucson: University of
Arizona Press, 1971); N. Lay, The Recognition of Community Property in Common
Law Provinces (1969), 34 Sask. Law Rev. 264.
8 E.g., Beaudoin v. Trudel, [1937] O.R. 1; [1937] 1 D.L.R. 216. See, infra, note 56.
4 For conflict of laws purposes, Anglo-American courts generally adopt the civil
law distinction between movables and immovables: see, J.-G. Castel, Canadian Conflict
of Laws (Toronto: Butterworths, 1975) at 42-43.
5 [1900] A.C. 21; 69 L.J. Ch. 109; 81 L.T. 733; 48 W.R. 269; 16 T.L.R. 101. For
immovables, see, Re De Nichols, [1900] 2 Ch. 410; 69 LJ.Ch. 680; 82 L.T. 840; 16
T.L.R. 461; 48 W.R. 602.
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married Celestine in France in 1854 without a formal marriage contract;
therefore, according to French law their property rights inter se were gov-
erned by the community property regime of the French Civil Code. In 1863,
they emigrated to England with about £-400 and became permanently domi-
ciled in London. Through their "united personal intelligence and indus-
try . . . ," they amassed a large fortune. De Nichols died in 1897, and
purported to dispose of the fortune by will as if it were his own absolutely.
His widow contended that by the community property regime of French law
she had a half-interest in the movable property and that the change in domi-
cile from France to England did not alter this result. Mr. Justice Kekewich
agreed, 7 but his decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals which felt
itself bound by the earlier decision of the House of Lords, Lashley v. Hog.9
The House of Lords restored the order of Justice Kekewich.
The Lord Chancellor, the Earl of Halsbury, noted that under French
law, the result of the marriage without a formal ante-nuptial contract was
that the spouses were treated just as if they had incorporated the community
property provisions of the Civil Code into an ante-nuptial contract.'0 Then,
the Lord Chancellor asserted:
[it is a little difficult to understand upon what principle contracts and obligations
already existing inter se should be affected by an act of one of the contracting
parties over which the other party to the contract has no control whatever. And
indeed, it is not denied that if, instead of the law creating these obligations on the
mere performance of the marriage, the parties had themselves by written instru-
ment recited in terms the very contract the law makes for them, in that case the
change in domicil could not have affected such written contract. I am wholly
unable to understand why the mere putting into writing the very same contract
which the law created between them without any writing at all should bar the
husband from altering the contract relations between himself and his wife; when
if the law creates that contract relation, then the husband is not barred from
getting rid of the obligation which upon his marriage the law affixed to the trans-
action."'
By equating the community property regime imposed by French law
0 [1900] A.C. 21 at 38, per Lord Brampton.
7 [1898] 1 Ch. 403, 67 L.J. Ch. 274.
8 [1898] 2 Ch. 60.
0 (1804), 4 Paton 581; 2 Coop. T. Cott. 449; 47 E.R. 1243, Lashley v. Hog is noted
in Goldberg, The Assignment of Property on Marriage (1970), 19 I.C.L.Q. 557 at
580-84.
10 [1900] A.C. 21 at 24. Similarly, Lord Macnaughten at 31; Lord Shand at 37-38;
Lord Brampton at 39-45 passim. Lord Morris concurred with the Lord Chancellor.
11 Id. at 26. Similarly, Lord Macnaughten at 33, 36; Lord Shand at 37; Lord
Brampton at 45-46. The accepted rule is that the terms of a marriage contract or set-
tlement govern the rights of the spouses with respect to their present and after-acquired
movable property: see, A. Anton, Private International Law (Edinburgh: W. Green
and Son, Ltd., 1967) at 448; G. Cheshire and P. N. North, Private International Law
(8th ed. London: Butterworths, 1970) at 570-78; A. Dicey and J. Morris, The Conflict
of Laws (8th ed. London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1967) at 105; H. Goodrich, Conflict
of Laws (3rd ed. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1949) at 390-92; H. Marsh, Martial
Property In Conflict of Laws (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1952) at 218-21;
J. Morris, The Conflict of Laws (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1971) at 394-400;
J. Story, Conflict of Laws (8th ed. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1883) at 240; J. D.
Falconbridge, Conflict of Laws (2nd ed. Toronto: Canada Law Book Co. Ltd., 1954)
at 105.
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with a marriage settlement or ante-nuptial contract, the House of Lords neatly
side-stepped the principle that personal rights and obligations vary with
changes in domicile.' 2
This would have ended the case were it not "embarrassed"'13 by an
earlier judgment of the House, Lashley v. Hog,'4 the case that the Court of
Appeal thought adverse to the widow's contentions.15 The facts of Lashley v.
Hog are essentially those of De Nichols v. Curlier in reverse. Roger Hog, a
Scot, settled in London and carried on business there as a merchant. In 1737
he married Rachel Missing. He prospered and acquired wealth. Some time
prior to 1760, the year in which Rachel died, he had returned to Scotland
and renewed his domicile there. He died in 1789 and left his fortune to his
son. Roger's daughter Rebecca (then the wife of one Thomas Lashley) sued
her brother claiming, inter alia, that portion of her father's movable property
that was her mother's under the Scottish communio bonorum and that had
descended to her on her mother's death in 1760.16 The House of Lords
decided in the daughter Rebecca's favour. In his speech, Lord Eldon said that
Rebecca had a claim in right of her mother to share in the movable estate
of her father at the time of her mother's death.17 Lord Eldon saw the case as
presenting the problem of whether the wife's rights were fixed immutably
at the time of the marriage by the law of the matrimonial domicile or whether
they varied with subsequent changes in the domicile of the spouses. 18 This
was an extremely important question, for under the law of England, the law
of the matrimonial domicile, the wife had no interest in her husband's movable
estate, while under the communio bonorrn of Scotland, the spouses' domicile
when the wife died, the wife had her jus relictae19 - a one-third interest in
her husband's movable estate.20 Lord Eldon stated that the spouses' matri-
monial property rights were mutable with changes in their domicile. 21 The Earl
12 See, [1900] A.C. 21 at 46, per Lord Brampton. An individual's domiciliary law
governs many of his important legal interests; in many senses, it is his "personal" law.
On domicile, see, generally, Castel, supra, note 4 at 101-36.
Is [1900] A.C. 21 at 31, per Lord Macnaughten.
14 Supra, note 9.
1 5 Supra, note 8 at 69, per Sir Nathaniel Lindley, M.R.
16 The inheritable quality of the wife's share under Scottish law in her husband's
movable property was abolished in 1855 so that the wife's interest becomes possessory
only if her husband predeceases her: The Intestate Moveable Succession (Scotland) Act,
1855 18 & 19 Vict., c. 23, s. 6. Until 1855, this share was due the wife's heirs even on
her predeceasing her husband: P. Fraser, Treatise on Husband and Wife According to
the Law of Scotland (2 vols. 2nd ed. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1876) at 671; G. Bell,
Principles of the Law of Scotland (3rd ed. Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1833) at 434.
17 47 E.R. 1243 at 1257.
18 1d. at 1257-58.
19 Id. at 1259, per Lord Eldon. The Earl of Rosslyn, at 1263, noted that the term
fus relictae was a misnomer in Scottish law - the wife's interest was not dependent on
her surviving her husband. See, supra, note 16.
2 0 The wife's jus relictae was one-third of her husband's moveable estate if there
were children, one-half if there were none: Fraser, supra, note 16 at 976, 978; Bell,
supra, note 16 at 430.
2147 E.R. 1243 at 1261.
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of Rosslyn agreed, emphasizing that the decision did not turn on "a metaphysi-
cal idea of an implied contract arising from the situation in which the parties
place themselves by a civil act [marriage]."
Their Lordships in De Nichols v. Curlier purported to distinguish Lashley
v. Hog on two grounds. The Lord Chancellor, who asserted Lashley v. Hog
was "distinguishable both in principle and in circumstances," 23 noted that
under the law of Scotland the wife merely had a hope of coming into "rights"
in her husband's movable property through the dissolution of the marriage
on the husband's death. These rights were merely debts against the husband's
executors and were not rights of division in a common fund. The communio
bonorum of Scottish law was a mere fiction, while under French law there
existed what was tantamount to an actual partnership of the spouses in the
matrimonial property that could not be altered by the unilateral act of one
of the spouses. Lashley v. Hog was merely an illustration of the accepted rule
that the law of a person's domicile at death regulates succession to his
movable estate.2 4
Lord Brampton took a slightly different tack in distinguishing Lashley
v. Hog. Lashley v. Hog involved a change in domicile from a country (Eng-
land) in which neither law nor the parties had made a settlement to a country
(Scotland) in which there was some sort of settlement in the form of the
communio bonorum. De Nichols v. Curlier, on the other hand, involved a
change from a country (France) that provided, by law, an elaborate and
binding settlement, to a country (England) that made no settlement at all.
The existence of this settlement by virtue of the law of the matrimonial
domicile distinguished De Nichols v. Curlier from Lashley v. Hog.25
Canadian courts generally have accorded a favourable reception to De
Nichols v. Curlier.26 But there has not been a rigorous examination by the
judges of the assumptions and rationale of the House of Lords. This is re-
markable when one considers the serious doubts that have been raised by the
writers about De Nichols v. Curlier. The modest goals of this comment is to
set out the criticisms that may be levelled against De Nichols v. Curlier from
the perspectives of fact, history and policy, and then to present and assess
briefly the other options that exist.
22 Id. at 1263.
23 [1900] A.C. 21 at 27. Lord Morris concurred with the Lord Chancellor's judgment.
24 Id. at 27-30. The Lord Chancellor adopted Lord Fraser's views on the nature of
the communio bonorum in Scottish law; see, Fraser, supra, note 16 at 648-78. Many
writers have accepted this explanation of Lashley v. Hog; see, Cheshire, supra, note 11
at 566-67; Falconbridge, supra, note 11 at 106; Goldberg, supra, note 9 at 578-79; J.
Westlake, Private International Law (7th ed. London: Sweet and Maxwell, Ltd., 1925)
at 74.
25 [1900] A.C. 21 at 44. Similarly, Lord Macnaughten at 33, 36; Lord Shand at 37.
2
6 See, Beaudoin v. Trudel, [1937] 1 D.L.R. 216 at 217; Re Parsons, [1926] 1 D.L.R.
1160 at 1161-2; Devos v. Devos (1970), 10 D.L.R. (3d) 603 at 611-12 (dictum); Pou-
liot v. Clothier, [1944] 3 D.L.R. 737 at 741-42 (dictum); cf., Brooks v. Brooks (1896),
2 Terr. L. R. 289 at 291-92 (S.C.N.W.T.). See, generally, J.-G. Castel, Private Inter-
national Law Rules Relating to Domestic Relations (1958-59); 5 McGill LJ. 4-7; Lay,
supra, note 2. But, see, Re Heung Won Lee (1963), 36 D.L.R. (2d) 177 at 183-84;
Pink v. Perlin & Co. (1898), 40 N.S.R. 260 at 262 (N.S.S.C.).
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B. FACTS
The House of Lords in De Nichols v. Curlier equated the community
property regime imposed by French law - a consequence that spouses must
know or be presumed to know as incidental to marrying without an express
marriage contract27 - with an express ante-nuptial agreement governing
matrimonial property rights. In other words, the spouses are taken to have
tacitly agreed to have their matrimonial property rights governed by the
community property regime, and it is to this agreement that the English
courts give effect.
This, of course, is fictional. It assumes a knowledge of the legal incidents
of marriage that few lay persons possess. Stripping the De Nichols v. Curlier
rationale to its essentials reveals its logical fallacy. English law provides for
the determination of matrimonial property rights according to the community
regime of France because the spouses have so contracted; the spouses are
presumed to have so contracted because French law so provides. Such a
rationale compels one to view a person's tort liability for assaulting another
as a matter of contract between the tortfeasor and victim. The community
property regime applies to the spouses not as a matter of contract, tacit or
otherwise, but because French law prescribes such a system.28
C. HISTORY
The Lord Chancellor distinguished Lashley v. Hog on the basis that
under the Scottish communio bonorum the wife merely had a spes successionis
in taking part of her husband's movable estate on his death, and, therefore,
it was merely illustrative of the rule that succession to movables is governed
by the law of the deceased's domicile at death. French law, on the other hand,
created a real partnership relationship between the spouses in their property
relations. Lord Brampton was less ambitious and distinguished De Nichols
v. Curlier from Lashley v. Hog on the narrow ground that in the former there
existed a tacit contract between the spouses that their property relations would
be governed by the community regime. The inarticulate premise of Lord
Brampton's assertion seems to be the same point urged by the Lord Chancellor,
namely, the Scottish communio bonorum was a mere fiction and completely
unlike the real community existent in France.
The nature and character of the communio bonorum of Scottish law is
a subject of controversy. Three theories have been advanced:
1) the wife's jus relictae and children's legitim were merely rights of succession;
2) the fus relictae and the legitim were merely debts against the husband and
father's movable estate; and,
27 [1900] A.C. 21 at 26, per Earl of Halsbury, L.C.
28 Goodrich, supra, note 11 at 387. See, J. Beale, Conflicts of Laws (3 vols. New
York: Baker, Voorhis and Co., 1935) at 1015; Falconbridge, supra, note 11 at 108-09;
Marsh, supra, note 11 at 106; Story, supra, note 11 at 249-50. Lord Fraser, on whom
the House of Lords placed so much reliance in De Nichols v. Curlier, rejected the tacit
contract theory relying in part on statements in Lashley v. Hog; Fraser, supra, note 16
at 1325. The Earl of Rosslyn emphatically rejected the tacit contract rationale in Lashley
v. Hog (1804), 47 E.R. 1243 at 1263. See, text accompanying supra, note 22.
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3) the ]us relictae and legitim were rights of division of a common stock of prop-
erty held by the husband, wife and children of the marriage.29
1. Rights of Succession
Some support for this theory is found in Bell,30 but otherwise there
appears to be no constructive evidence to support it.31 Indeed, there are
several serious objections to such a theory. Firstly, jus relictae and legitim
were indefeasible and overrode any contrary disposition by will.3 2 Secondly,
before 1855 the wife's jus relictae could be claimed by her representatives if
she predeceased her husband a3 Nemo est haeres viventis. Treating the wife's
jus relictae as merely a right of succession leads to the absurd conclusion
that the dead may inherit from the living. 4 This latter point of itself, demon-
strates that the jus relictae was something more than a mere right of succession.
2. Debts
The Lord Chancellor embraced Lord Fraser's views that the ius relictae
and legitim of Scottish law were merely debts against the husband and father's
estate.3 5 Lord Fraser's chapter on the communio bonorum has been described
as "very unconvincing"3 6 though it has also been characterized as the "now
20 See, G. C. Paton, "Husband and Wife Property Rights and Relationships," in
An Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Vol. 20, Stair Society Edinburgh: R. Cun-
ningham, (1958) at 113 (theories and authorities reviewed); J. Gardner, The Origin and
Nature of the Legal Rights of Spouses and Children in the Scottish Law of Succession
(1928), 40 lurid. Rev. 72.
80 Bell, supra, note 16 at 431, ss. 582 (legitim a right of succession to a share of
father's movable estate vesting in children on father's death). See, Gardner, id. at 72-74
(argument in support of theory set out).
81 Gardner, id. at 75.
32 F. P. Walton, The Relationship of the Law of France to the Law of Scotland
(1902), 14 lurid. Rev. 17 at 20-21, 24; Gardner, id. at 75.
83 See, supra, note 16.
34 Gardner, supra, note 29 at 75; Marsh, supra, note 11 at 105; Walter, supra, note
32 at 24. Thus, the Lord Chancellor's characterization of Lashley v. Hog as a succession
case seems remarkable, especially as this point was expressly noted by Sir Nathaniel
Lindley, M. R. in the Court of Appeal, [1898] 2 Ch. 60 at 68. The latter said:
But when the question is, as it was in Lashley v. Hog, whether on the wife's death
in her husband's lifetime any part of his property became hers or became payable
to persons claiming through her as if it were her property, it is very difficult to
understand upon what principle recourse is had to the law of succession.
05 [1900] A.C. 21 at 30. See, text accompanying supra, note 24. The Lord Chancel-
lor's reliance on Lord Fraseres views is nothing short of amazing. Fraser had reached
his conclusion that jus relictae and legitim were mere debts by noting that by his
reading of history the communio had originated among the Germanic nations, and
among those people it was a partnership proper between the spouses. Fraser asserted,
however, that in France and Scotland, the communio was a mere fiction: Fraser, supra,
note 16 at 650-55, 669-70. Fraser clearly equated the communio bonorum of Scotland
(a fiction imported in the seventeenth century into Scottish law from France) with the
community regime of France. The Lord Chancellor was inconsistent in relying on Fraser
for support that the communio of Scotland was a mere fiction, and then asserting that
there existed a true community regime in France. See, De Funiak & Vaughan, supra,
note 2 at 37.
3a Walton, supra, note 32 at 23.
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generally accepted views."37 The prevalence of Fraser's views must be attrib-
utable solely to the high esteem his works generally command, for his argu-
ment that there never existed a communio in Scotland save in name alone
may be persuasively criticized on almost every point.38
Firstly, though usually the wife's jus relictae and children's legitim were
satisfied by the husband's executor, these claims were never treated as debts
in the ordinary sense: the wife and children could not compete with the claims
of even ordinary creditors of the deceased husband and father.39 Furthermore,
Lord Fraser never articulated what the juridical bases of these debts were.
Moreover, he never explains how these claims of the wife and children as
creditors are reconcilable with his assertion that the husband and father was
an absolute owner of the property subject to these claims. Fraser's commit-
ment to perceiving the husband and father as an absolute owner would seem
to ineluctably lead him not only to reject the notion of a real communio but
also to reject his own theory. If the husband and father was an absolute
owner, the wife and children would seem to have no claims whatsoever against
his property.
4°
Lord Fraser also asserted that the doctrine of communio bonorum was
a late-comer to the law of Scotland. His thesis was that it came to Scotland
in the seventeenth century as a result of the practice of Scottish lawyers to
acquire a knowledge of their profession in France, and the communio bonorum
was introduced into Scottish law by these lawyers.41 The doctrine gained
acceptance when it received the imprimatur of two of Scotland's great insti-
tutional legal writers, Lord Stair in 1681, and Erskine in 1773.4 But Lord
Fraser fails to demonstrate that this new terminology employed by Stair
and Erskine reflected any substantive alteration in the law of Scotland as
it had been applied up to their time.43 It is arguable that the communio
bonorum phraseology was adopted merely as a compendious term, borrowed
from French sources, to describe the wife's jus relictae and children's legitim.4
4
Why then did as eminent a writer as Lord Fraser err? This occurred
because Lord Fraser was unable to reconcile the extensive administrative
3 7 Paton, supra, note 29 at 113.
38 See, Gardner, supra, note 29; Walton, supra, note 32.
30 Gardner, id. at 76.
40 See, id. at 77.
4 1 Lord Fraser's view of the communio as a late introduction into Scottish law is
shared by Paton, supra, note 29 at 100; De Funiak, Equity and Community of Property
in Scots Law (1965), 10 S. D. L. Rev. 70 at 73-74; De Funiak & Vaughan, supra, note
2 at 36.
42 See, Fraser, supra, note 16 at 656-66 where he refers to Sir James Dalrymple
(Viscount of Stair), Institutions of the Law of Scotland (1681) and John Erskine, An
Institute of the Law of Scotland (1773).
43 Gardner, supra, note 29 at 78.
44 Indeed, Gardner and Walton have argued persuasively that these rights had their
roots in an older community regime that was part of the customary law of Normandy.
These customs were introduced into England after the conquest, and then to Scotland:
see, Gardner, id. at 80-86; Gardner, An Historical Survey of the Law of Scotland Prior
to the Reign of David 1 (1945), 59 Jurid. Rev. 34, 65 at 69-71; Walton, supra, note 32 at
21-22.
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powers and control accorded the husband under the communio of both Scot-
land and France with the notion that the wife had property rights. He saw
the wife as having no control over the property, and concluded that she could
not be an owner in any real sense:
45
[H]e saw only the present, not the future, the present unity of the mass, not its
future division into shares. And so he said boldly that the whole mass belonged
to the husband.46
In other words, Lord Fraser misapprehended the whole nature of the corn-
munio bonorum. The husband's administrative powers were not equivalent
to the control that the common law once gave a husband over his wife's
property rendering him the owner thereof. Indeed, on dissolution of the
marriage, the wife or her representatives acquired the same administrative
powers that had formerly been in the husband over her share.47
3. Rights of Division
Much of what has been written above regarding the inadequacies of the
other theories about the nature of the communio bonorum supports the theory
that the Scottish communia prevalent at the time Lashley v. Hog was decided4s
was in fact analogous to the community regime that exists in France.
49
Treating the jus relictae and legitim as rights in division is consistent with
the right prior to 1855 of the wife's representatives to immediately claim her
share in the movable property on her predeceasing her husband. Furthermore,
such a theory does not force one into formulating a vague and inconsistent
theory that the ]us relictae and legitim were merely debts. Finally, this theory
that the jus relictae and legitim were rights in division is congruent with what
is known about their origin.
Thus, it is asserted that the House of Lords in De Nichols v. Curlier
failed to advance any cogent reasons for distinguishing Lashley v. Hog.50
45 Fraser, supra, note 16 at 673-78. Indeed, the husband's administrative powers,
though characterized as absolute, were in reality limited. Indubitably, he was accorded
extensive powers, but he could not defeat the rights of the wife or children by fraud,
deeds mortis causa or deeds on his deathbed: Bell, supra, note 16 at 426.
4oF. Pollock and F. Maitland, The History of English Law (2d ed. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1898) at 432 (describing a similar error made by English
lawyers). See, Gardner, supra, note 29 at 78-79.
4 7 De Funiak & Vaughan, supra, note 2 at 6, 258-59.
48 It, of course, would be absurd to contend in the face of the numerous legislative
amendments since 1855, that the jus relictae and legitim in current Scottish law are
rights in division. For the current law, see, D. Walker, Principles of Scottish Private Law
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970) at 1895-1910; Anton, The Effect of Marriage Upon
Property in Scots Law (1956), 19 Mod. L. Rev. 653.
4
0 The communio bonorum of Scotland applied only to movable property; the
community regime of France is much more extensive.
50 It has been noted that on strict constitutional grounds there is no need for the
House of Lords to reconcile these two cases. Lashley v. Hog went on appeal to the
House from the Scottish Court of Session, and the House was sitting as a Scottish court
when it laid down a Scottish conflict rule. De Nichols v. Curlier arose in the English
Courts, and was decided by the House of Lords as an English court articulating an
English conflict rule: Marsh, supra, note 11 at 108.
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D. POLICY
Is the result in De Nichols v. Curlier nonetheless defensible on the
ground that it fosters the attainment of desirable policies in the conflict of
laws? 51 Among the learned writers in the conflict of laws, De Nichols v.
Curlier is characterized as a decision that represents the immutability prin-
ciple for governing matrimonial property rights. Under this principle, the law
of the spouses' matrimonial domicile determines the spouses' property rights
for all their property whether it was acquired before or after a change in their
matrimonial domicile.52 The immutability principle does advance the policy
favouring the treatment of the property of each spouse as a unit governed by
a single set of legal rules.53 However, it runs counter to the policy of fulfilling
the normal expectations of spouses, especially where they are compelled to
change their domicile through political or economic pressure and acquire a
domicile of choice elsewhere. Under the immutability principle, their matri-
monial property rights would continue to be governed by the law of their
matrimonial domicile - a country with which they would have only a tenuous
connection.54
Additionally, in terms of efficiency it is desirable to maximize the oppor-
tunities for the forum court to apply its own law. Under the immutability
doctrine, all immigrant couples would be subject to foreign matrimonial
property regimes. 55
Finally, the immutability doctrine may give rise to questions of charac-
terization the resolutions of which are more nice than obvious. This point is
illustrated neatly by Beaudoin v. Trudel,55 a decision of the Ontario Court
of Appeal. The spouses, whose original matrimonial domicile was Quebec,
moved to Ontario where all the matrimonial property was acquired. The wife
died intestate. In accord with De Nichols v. Curlier, the husband took one-half
of the wife's property under the Quebec community property regime. As to
the remaining half, the Court of Appeal decided that as entitlement thereto
was a matter of succession, the law of the wife's domicile at death, Ontario,
governed. Under Ontario law relating to intestate succession, half of the re-
maining half devolved to the husband. In total result, by interaction of the
conflict rules relating to matrimonial property and succession, the husband
received more of his wife's estate than he would have received had the
problem been governed exclusively by either Quebec or Ontario law.57
51 The policies are set out in Castel, supra, note 4 at 7-11; Marsh, id. at 94.
52 See, Dicey, supra, note 11 at 392-93; Marsh, id. at 106; Morris, supra, note 11
at 640-41.
53 Marsh, id. at 106.
54 Dicey, supra, note 11 at 641; Marsh, id. at 106-07. Marsh also notes that this
principle may thwart the expectations of creditors of the spouses.
55 Marsh, id. at 107.
56 [1937] O.R. 1; [1937] 1 D.L.R. 216.
57 See, also, Dicey, supra, note 11 at 641-42.
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E. OPTIONS
As there is little to say in favour of De Nichols v. Curlier, what principle
ought to apply? The obvious option is what has been described as the full
mutability principle as illustrated by Lashley v. Hog. The law of the spouses'
current domicile determines their matrimonial property rights with respect
to all their property whether acquired before or after a change in domicile. 5s
This principle, however, cuts athwart the policy of protecting and continuing
the vested interests of the spouses.59
The final, and in this writer's view, optimal solution is to adopt the partial
mutability doctrine. The authors of Dicey and Morris formulate the doctrine
in this manner:
Where there is no marriage contract or settlement, and where there is a subsequent
change of domicile, the rights of husband and wife to each other's movables, both
inter vivos and in respect of succession, are governed by the law of the new domi-
cile, except insofar as vested rights have been acquired under the law of the
former domicile. 00
The advantages of such a doctrine are many. It allows the interment of
the tacit contract theory with its fallacious suggestion that the courts are
merely implementing the agreement of the spouses. The courts may admit that
they are deliberately sculpting a rule that maximizes the fulfillment of the
policies of private international law.
Partial mutability is the amalgamation of the full mutability and immu-
tability doctrines that are displayed respectively in Lashley v. Hog and De
Nichols v. Curlier. It stands up well under a policy evaluation. Although it
raises the possibility of more than one set of legal rules governing the division
of the matrimonial property, it does seem to foster the fulfillment of the
spouses' expectations in a situation where they have not unequivocally ex-
pressed their intentions. Their personal law, the law of their domicile when
the property was acquired, determines the manner in which the property will
be divided.
Unquestionably, although it would be more efficient and economical for
a court to apply its own regime of matrimonial property to the case before
it, the prospect that such a rule would defeat vested rights requires that it be
rejected. The partial mutability doctrine, however, does allow the court to
apply its regime to property acquired by the spouses while they were in its
jurisdiction.
In a nutshell, the immutability doctrine fails because of its inflexibility;
it ignores the changed circumstances of the spouses. On the other hand, full
mutability tampers with vested rights. Partial mutability is an effective com-
promise between the two.
In the cases, there is authority that supports the partial mutability
5BSee, Cheshire, supra, note 11 at 566; Marsh, supra, note 11 at 104.
59 Marsh, id. at 105.
60 Dicey, supra, note 11 at 640; Goodrich, supra, note 11 at 385; Marsh, id. at 108-
10; Morris, supra, note 11 at 394. Cf., Falconbridge, supra, note 11 at 109.
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doctrine. In Re Heung Won Lee,6' the spouses' original matrimonial domicile
was Korea, a separate property regime. They acquired a domicile in Brazil,
a community regime, where the husband died. Although noting that the law
was unsettled, the British Columbia Supreme Court decided that the wife's
interest in the proceeds of' her husband's life insurance was governed by
Brazilian law.62
An early articulation of the partial mutability doctrine is found in Pink
v. Perlin & Co.0 Creditors of the husband seized the family furniture. The
wife claimed that the furniture was her own; she had purchased it with money
earned before her marriage in Ohio in 1887. Mr. Justice Meagher asserted
that under the common law in force in Ohio the money became her husband's
on marriage. The fact that they later moved to and became domiciled in Nova
Scotia where Married Women's Property legislation was in force would not
defeat the husband's vested rights in the money with which the furniture was
bought. Mr. Justice Meagher said:
The law appears to be that the mutual rights of the husband and wife as to their
personal property are governed by the law of their matrimonial domicil, and
such rights are not affected by a subsequent change, but rights acquired after such
change are, of course, governed by the law of the actual domicil.64
The creditors had merely seized the husband's furniture.
It is hoped that this doctrine of partial mutability will gain further ac-
ceptance in the courts.
61 (1963), 36 D.L.R. (2d) 177; 40 W.W.R. 152 (B.C.S.C.).
62 Id. at 183-84. This case may also be characterized as a matter of succession.
63 (1898), 40 N.S.R. 260.
64 Id. at 262.
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